“VIRTUAL CHILD” PORNOGRAPHY ON THE INTERNET: A
“VIRTUAL” VICTIM?
Child pornography is an exception to First Amendment freedoms
because it exploits and abuses our nation’s youth.1 The latest trend in
that industry is “virtual child” pornography. “Virtual child”
pornography does not use real children or images of real identifiable
children. When the object of desire is not a child, but merely a
combination of millions of computer pixels crafted by a skilled artist, can
the government ban this allegedly victimless creation?2

Introduction
Congress enacted the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (“CPPA”) to fight the
ongoing battle against the sexual exploitation of children.3 However, Congress drafted the CPPA
very broadly, and with the advancement of technology the statute may encroach on First
Amendment rights to free speech.4 Most people would agree that the use of actual children in the
production of sexually explicit videos or photographs is grotesque child abuse. The question
remains whether the government may criminalize the production and possession of “virtual child”
pornography if no child is used in the production of pornography and the images are completely
fictional. In Ashcroft v. The Free Speech Coalition, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
government may not criminalize such action because the production of “virtual child”
pornography does not sexually abuse an actual child.5 The Court rejected the government’s
argument that “virtual child” pornography encourages pedophiles to abuse children.

This

argument is the intellectual equivalent of a claim that Romeo and Juliet encourages teenagers to
kill themselves and should be banned from high school reading lists. More people would find
greater social value in Romeo and Juliet than in “virtual child” pornography, but if there is some
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social or artistic value to a piece of work, it should be protected under the freedom of speech
clause of the First Amendment.6 “Virtual child” pornography must be distinguished from actual
child pornography in order to be protected under the First Amendment. The Supreme Court held
the CPPA to be unconstitutional by making the distinction between “virtual” and actual child
pornography and by doing so, expanded the field of free speech.7

Ashcroft v. The Free Speech Coalition and the Effect of the Decision
In Ashcroft v. The Free Speech Coalition, the Ninth Circuit held the CPPA to be
unconstitutional, a decision contrary to those in four other circuits.8 The U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari to resolve the circuit split and held that the speech prohibited by the CPPA’s
ban on “virtual child” pornography is distinguishable from actual child pornography.9 As written,
§ 2256(8)(B) of the CPPA “abridges the freedom to engage in a substantial amount of lawful
speech.”10 The Court held that the ban on “virtual child” pornography could not be upheld
because it was overbroad and unconstitutional under the First Amendment.
Unlike cases in other circuits, which involved violations of the CPPA, the Free Speech
Coalition (“the Coalition”) was an association of businesses in the adult-entertainment industry
that produced and distributed adult material. The Coalition sought to overturn the law preenforcement, alleging that the “appears to be” and “conveys the impression” provisions of the
CPPA are overbroad and vague.11 The CPPA expanded the ban on child pornography to include
“any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computergenerated image or picture” that “is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit
conduct.”12

The Coalition argued that the CPPA was not supported by and goes beyond earlier

decisions regarding obscenity and child pornography,13 extending to images that were not
obscene or even necessarily offensive, but would prohibit “visual depictions, such as movies,
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even if they have redeeming social value.”14 Additionally, these provisions would extend to
items such as reproductions of paintings “depicting a scene from classical mythology” because
the subject matter “appears to be” minors involved in sexually explicit conduct.15 Even when real
children are not used (such as in “virtual child” pornography, a Hollywood movie using adult
actors or a painting or cartoon involving sexually active minors), the CPPA would criminalize
any depiction of sexually explicit situations involving what appear to be minors.16
The government presented four arguments supporting the CPPA’s constitutionality.
First, it claimed that “virtual child” pornography causes indirect harm to actual children,17
contending that the production of virtual pornographic images can lead to child abuse.18

The

Court did not accept the government’s indirect harm argument noting instead that “virtual child
pornography is not ‘intrinsically related’ to the sexual abuse of children”19 and that “the causal
link is contingent and indirect.”20 The government relied on the Ferber case, but to no avail. The
Free Speech Coalition court held that Ferber provides no support for the elimination of the
distinction between actual and “virtual child” pornography.21

In fact, the court in Ferber

recognized that some works might have societal value as an alternative means of expression.22
Second, the government argued that “virtual child” pornography could have the tendency
to persuade the audience to commit crimes.23 The Court struck down this argument, stating, “the
prospect of crime, however, by itself does not justify laws suppressing protected speech.”24 Even
if virtual pornography encourages unlawful acts, “it is not a sufficient reason for banning it.”25
“The Government has shown no more than a remote connection between speech that might
encourage thoughts or impulses and any resulting child abuse” therefore, the government may not
prohibit the speech expressed in “virtual child” pornography based on this unsupported
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argument.26 The government can punish the perpetrators of sexual abuse of children and punish
people who provide explicit materials to children in order to seduce or convince the child to
engage in sexual activities.27

Also, the government may not prohibit adults from material

protected by free speech in an attempt to prevent children from obtaining it.28
Third, the government argued that eliminating the market for actual child pornography
was a sufficient reason for the Court to uphold the constitutionality of the law.29 The Court
disagreed and noted that the market for actual child pornography might be eliminated if there was
an alternative source.30 “If virtual images were identical to illegal child pornography, the illegal
images would be driven from the market by the indistinguishable substitutes. Few pornographers
would risk prosecution by abusing real children if fictional, computerized images would
suffice.”31 The Court held that virtual pornography does not necessarily promote the market for
actual child pornography and recognized the distinction between the two.32 The Court stated that
the government’s market theory was unpersuasive especially because there is no crime involved
in “virtual child” pornography since no children are used in the production of the work.33
Fourth, the government also argued that “virtual child” pornography could result in more
difficult prosecutions of actual child molesters and pornographers since the virtual images look so
realistic.34 The government wants to pass this difficulty on to the potential defendant through the
statute’s affirmative defense option.35 The defendant can rely on the affirmative defense if he can
prove that the alleged child pornography was made using real persons who were adults and the
material was not marketed as depicting children.36 The affirmative defense option raises other
constitutional concerns because the defendant would have the burden of proving that the material
was protected by the First Amendment. The Court noted that, “the Government may not suppress
lawful speech as the means to suppress unlawful speech. Protected speech does not become
unprotected speech merely because it resembles the latter.”37 All four of the government’s
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arguments were unsuccessful and the Supreme Court held that the CPPA was unconstitutionally
overbroad.38

Should “virtual child” pornography be prohibited?
The easiest and most popular answer would be yes. Parents arrested for the online
sharing of explicit photos of their own children are just one example of how child pornography,
though extremely socially unacceptable, is an already created and unfortunately booming
market.39 Banning “virtual child” pornography might spur the actual child pornography market if
the penalties are the same and it is more expensive to create virtual pornography. If “virtual
child” pornography were allowed, the perpetrators of actual child pornography might think twice
about exploiting real children since there would be a legal and victimless alternative. “If virtual
images were identical to illegal child pornography, the illegal images would be driven from the
market by the indistinguishable substitutes.

Few pornographers would risk prosecution by

abusing real children if fictional, computerized images would suffice.”40
“The sexual abuse of a child is a most serious crime and an act repugnant to the moral
instincts of a decent people.”41 The relevant primary objectives of the government are and should
be to protect the children from sexual abuse and to prosecute those who abuse children.42
However, a ban on “virtual child” pornography is not a viable solution for preventing sexual
abuse. “Virtual child” pornography could potentially shield children from abuse since pedophiles
could use this alternative source to fulfill their desires, however repugnant. Since “virtual child
pornography is not ‘intrinsically related’ to the sexual abuse of children,” the government’s
interest in preventing the exploitation of children might be too tenuous to enforce.43 If the
government’s goal truly is to eliminate the sexual exploitation of children, the most logical
solution would be to find a solution to the illegal market. It is evident that the current criminal
statutes do not entirely deter child abusers.44 The Free Speech Coalition court believes that the
alternative of legal “virtual child” pornography would reduce the production of actual child
pornography because people could not be punished for the creation or possession of this
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substitute.45 In addition, stiffer penalties for actual child pornographers and sexual abusers would
prevent more abuse than prohibiting “virtual child” pornography as an alternative to abuse.

New Legislative Attempts to Ban “Virtual Child” Pornography
The CPPA is unconstitutional as written, but new bills are attempting to re-write the
legislation to make it an actionable criminal law without violating the First Amendment. New
bills have been introduced in the House of Representatives and the Senate to amend the CPPA
(now entitled the Child Obscenity and Pornography Prevention Act of 2002).46

Section

2256(8)(B) would be amended to read, “such visual depiction is a computer image or computergenerated image that is, or appears virtually indistinguishable from, that of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct.”47

The new bills still maintain the prohibition of “virtual child”

pornography even though the Supreme Court has indicated it is protected speech.
The bill maintains the affirmative defense to a charge of violating the law if “the alleged
offense did not involve child pornography produced using a minor engaging in sexually explicit
conduct or an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense involving such child pornography.”48
This affirmative defense could be used in the prosecution of an adult actor playing the role of a
minor in sexually explicit situations in a Hollywood movie. The affirmative defense could also
be used by a producer of “virtual child” pornography if the virtual image is “virtually
indistinguishable” from reality. This affirmative defense shifts the burden of proof from the
government to the producer of the work. In The Free Speech Coalition, the Court emphasized
that if the government would have a difficult time prosecuting virtual pornographers, then the
defendant would have just as hard of a time proving his innocence by demonstrating that real
children were not used especially if the defendant was not the producer but a mere possessor of
the virtual pornography.49
On July 17, 2002, a Joint Resolution was proposed to add a constitutional amendment
respecting real and “virtual child” pornography.50 “Section 1. Neither the Constitution nor any
State constitution shall be construed to protect child pornography, defined as visual depictions by
any technological means of minor persons, whether actual or virtual, engaged in explicit sexual
activity. Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate
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legislation.”51

This proposed amendment is again overbroad and contradicts the First

Amendment because it would eliminate a substantial subsection of artistically valuable work.
Hollywood movies and television programs have many examples of visual depictions of “minors”
engaged in explicit sexual activity. The proposed amendment bans not only explicit pictures of
prepubescent children but depictions of 17 year-olds engaged in sexual activities that might not
be offensive to community standards much like the original CPPA.52

Conclusion
The proposed amendment is so broad that it would encompass much of the entertainment
industry. Imagine if all the movies depicting minors in sexually explicit situations were removed
from the store shelves. Some very popular movies and works of art would suddenly become
illegal contraband. It could happen if Congress passes this proposed amendment. Congress has
again failed to narrowly tailor the law but hopefully, for the sake of our freedom of speech, the
proposed amendment shall fail as well. The Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. The Free
Speech Coalition indicates that there is a way to tailor the revision of the CPPA without violating
the First Amendment.53 If the government believes that “virtual child” pornography will be used
by child abusers to convince their victims to participate in sexual activities,54 Congress could
narrowly tailor a criminal statute to punish such uses of the materials severely without banning
the creation and possession of the work. Banning “virtual child” pornography will not effectively
protect the nation’s children from perpetrators. It will simply eliminate a victimless alternative
that is substantially less repugnant than the abuse of actual children. The proposed constitutional
amendment and congressional bills are plagued with the same problem of being overbroad as the
CPPA and violate the First Amendment’s protection of the freedom of speech.
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